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SOCIAL VENTURES AS INNOVATORS AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the unaddressed potential of social ventures to implement social and 
technological innovations. The innovative activities of social ventures serving populations at the 
base of the pyramid (BOP) provide relevant evidence. Resource based theory and the concept of 
business ecosystems provided constructs to be operationalized through case evidence, while case 
studies helped integrate and adapt these theories to illuminate social entrepreneurship. The 
framework provides a basis for comparing two different social ventures creating value at the 
BOP: a technology-based social venture and another undertaking health delivery. These ventures 
enabled user interaction and feedback and enlisted public-private partnerships. The cases show 
how social ventures can develop innovative business models that combine internal resources 
with external resources from their ecosystem in order to build shared value. The conceptual 
framework can be used to identify key features of other cases of entrepreneurial value creation in 
conditions of poverty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An emerging stream of research examines new organizations that aim at achieving social impact 
(Phills et al., 2008, Seelos and Mair, 2005).  The focus of this paper is on social ventures using 
innovative business models to address global challenges of poverty.  Incentives to offer valued 
goods and services usually arise through market exchange. For the very poor who lack 
purchasing power, there is chronic under provision of services.  Approximately 1.5 billion people 
live at the base of the income pyramid on less than $1.25 per day caught in poverty traps. The 
development literature has documented attempts by government, development professionals and 
private sector multinationals to remedy these conditions (Webb et al., 2010, London and Hart, 
2004).  However, grassroots entrepreneurial efforts have received relatively little attention in the 
research literature.  This paper investigates the unaddressed potential of social ventures to 
implement social and technological innovation. We show that the business models of two social 
ventures enabled them to sustain the generation of social value by connecting their internal 
resources with complementary resources from an ecosystem mobilized for innovation. 
 
The first case study is of FrontlineSMS, a UK social venture that provides free software to 
enable low-cost means of mass communication.  Its platform technology allows a community of 
grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international agencies and ordinary people 
to communicate at a distance by mobile telephony without Internet access.  The second study is 
of an entrepreneurial NGO using a social franchising model to deliver healthcare.  Operation 
ASHA (“OpASHA”), is working in partnership with the Indian Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare to deliver tuberculosis treatment to the poorest patients in urban slums, achieving high 
rates of patient compliance and cure. 
 
Using these two exemplars to clarify concepts and constructs that have wider generality, we 
examine the collaborative building of shared value by social entrepreneurs that enable delivery 
of innovations to populations at the base of the income pyramid.  
  
Institutional scholars see opportunities for innovation as dependent on external market factors 
	   3 
and on social, political and institutional arrangements (Fligstein, 2001, North, 1990). In contrast, 
adherents of resource based theory see internal resource organization as the key to realizing 
business opportunities (Barney, 1991, Penrose, 1995, Wernerfelt, 1984). But few scholars have 
set these issues in the context of innovation by social entrepreneurs. How can social 
entrepreneurs enable shared value creation between multiple participants? Examining 
implementation strategies by social ventures helps to illuminate this research question. Social 
entrepreneurs, as a subset of all entrepreneurs (Dacin et al., 2010), can match supply and with 
both effective and latent demand in innovative ways to produce novel solutions (Drucker, 1985).  
 
We propose that a social venture can develop a business model that links its internal resources 
with complementary resources in its environment in order to meet social needs. Theoretical 
grounding for the study lies in the resource based theory of the firm (Penrose 1995) and the 
concept of the innovation ecosystem (Adner 2006), adapted to the case of new social ventures. 
While theory points to relevant evidence, observations on the innovative business models of 
social ventures can inform resource-based and ecosystem theory. The ecosystem as we define it 
includes customers, suppliers, funders, providers of infrastructure, regulators and policy makers. 
The participants form a value web that adapts to change, supports innovation  and can be viewed 
as an innovative ecosystem (Adner, 2006). The concept can be operataionzlied in terms of the 
transaction environment of the organization by identifying those with which the organization is 
in regular interaction.  
 
We build on entrepreneurship studies that have researched how social entrepreneurs deliver 
missing services at the base of the pyramid (Mair and Marti, 2009). There has been increasing 
interest in how partnerships and alliances can make products and services available to the poor 
(Karamchandani et al., 2009, Webb et al., 2010). To this end a number of recent studies have 
focused on the role of public-private partnerships between powerful public actors and large 
multinational private-sector players.  Evidence presented here indicates that social innovation at 
the grassroots level may enable such alliances to achieve their aims. The challenges facing 
entrepreneurial innovators include those of advancing their novel idea through the innovation 
process: from discovery to development and onto delivery of benefits accruing to the user 
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007).   
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The paper is organized as follows. We begin with an overview of relevant literature on 
entrepreneurship and social value.  We identify features of experience depicted in this literature 
that apply to social entrepreneurs serving base of pyramid communities. We use the case studies 
of FrontlineSMS and Operation ASHA to show how business models mobilize internal and 
external resources to build shared value. Our findings contribute to integrating theories of social 
entrepreneurship with mainstream theory on resource building, on business ecosystems and on 
the business models that bridge these domains.   
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Social Entrepreneurship as a sub-set of Entrepreneurship 
Problems of deep poverty are seldom viewed as amenable to entrepreneurial solutions.  Yet 
history shows that entrepreneurial innovations have persistently met needs in new ways, 
transforming many industries (Nairn, 2002).  In simplest terms, this is because entrepreneurs 
have detected opportunities and realized them by linking up supply and demand, resources and 
opportunities in new ways (Drucker, 1985, Penrose, 1995). Entrepreneurs excel at recognizing 
and exploiting opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Research on entrepreneurial 
innovation shows how entrepreneurs can craft new hybrid structures needed to realize 
opportunities (Chandler, 1977, Mair and Marti, 2009).  
 
Scholars continue to debate the definition of social entrepreneurship. All enterprises encompass 
to some extent the social aims of employment, growth and prosperity for the community 
(Reynolds et al., 2005). Not-for-profit organisations traditionally depend on resources from 
donors and funders (Salamon, 1995), but the ideal for the social venture is a revenue generation 
stream that is sustainable, an idea aligned with current pro-business ideology (Dart, 2004). This 
does not mean that their activities must depend on market returns, though they may do so 
(Peredo and Chrisman, 2006, Seelos and Mair, 2005).  A key role of the social entrepreneur is to 
identify under-utilized resources and find ways of putting them to use to satisfy unmet social 
needs (Leadbeater, 1997).  
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Social Value 
While most work on value creation has a focus on the creation and capture of economic value, it 
is increasingly acknowledged that the social value created by innovation is of no less importance.  
Moreover the principle of shared value recognizes that social needs, not just consumer needs, can 
provide contexts for value creation (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Thus an expanded view of value 
creation has emerged in recent work.  It is recognized that there are two key conditions for value 
creation: first, the monetary amount exchanged must exceed the producer’s costs of creating the 
value and second, the value enjoyed by the consumer must be perceived to be greater than from 
the consumer’s closest alternative (Lepak et al., 2007).  
 
The literature suggests that a supportive ecosystem (Adner, 2006) may be critical to building 
shared value. Social entrepreneurs cannot realize opportunities on a solo basis.  As in the concept 
of open innovation as a source of growth for established innovators (Chesbrough, 2003), social 
entrepreneurs often work to harness positive network effects and resources. To sustain a product 
offering, the organization itself needs to be sustained and to engage in a renewal cycle with its 
resource providers, continuously improving its resource base and reinvesting returns in further 
operations.  
 
New organizations have to show that they can meet needs of other participants in order to 
establish legitimacy and take part in a business ecosystem. Working with established 
organizations in the ecosystem allows a new entrepreneurial organization to gain legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995) and to reduce risks (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Collaboration with 
customers and suppliers helps to define the new value proposition around a seed innovation 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003, Moore, 1993). Once admitted to an on-going ecosystem, the 
entrepreneurial innovator can mobilize and leverage resources of other partners and ultimately 
contribute back to the innovation ecosystem. In some cases entrepreneurs need to create a new 
ecosystem that will support their innovations (Garnsey and Leung 2008).  
 
Entrepreneurs need to build what Penrose called a productive base or resource base from which 
to operate (Penrose, 1995). A unique set of resources supports their unique selling point (USP), 
that is, enables them to offer value that is otherwise unavailable. We propose that an innovative 
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business model is needed to link internal and external resources to enable the venture to realize 
the opportunities in creating social value. In this paper we seek to understand: 1) how social 
entrepreneurs build a productive resource base from which to create value at the base of the 
income pyramid; 2) the nature of an innovative ecosystem in which entrepreneurs enlist others in 
the creation of social value; and 3) what business models can be used to achieve these benefits. 
Our approach is interpretive rather than positivist; the primary aim is to improve understanding 
rather than to provide predictions.  We propose a conceptual model that can be systematically 
operationalized on the basis of constructs and evidence  beyond the cases we present (Lee, 
1991).   
 
 
An explanatory model of value creation at the base of the pyramid  
Social Entrepreneurship and value creation  
In this section we draw on a range of literature to build a simple model of value generation by 
social entrepreneurs at the base of the pyramid. Here we address the innovative activity of 
entrepreneurs who initiate social transformation (Dees, 2001, Prabhu, 1999) and through new 
combinations, create value for themselves and the ecosystem (Bull and Willard, 1993, 
Schumpeter, 1934). What features of entrepreneurship do social entrepreneurs share? Like other 
entrepreneurs they are characterized by the following features, recognized by contributors to the 
entrepreneurship literature (Dacin et al., 2010). They show alertness to opportunity, as 
emphasized by classic writers (Kirzner, 1979, Schumpeter, 1934).  This enables them to 
recognize and exploit opportunities to provide new goods and services (Venkataraman, 1997).  
They draw upon prior knowledge and understanding (Shane, 2000) to recognize new 
opportunities and fill an unmet need.  This involves providing a new value proposition and 
linking demand and supply in new ways (Drucker, 1985). Entrepreneurs act on the decision to 
exploit an identified opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) often by harnessing strong 
personal networks (Ozgen and Baron, 2007, Singh, 2000).  They obtain, build and organize 
resources in new ways to realize opportunities (Garnsey, 1998, Penrose, 1995).  
 
We see explanatory potential in applying these accepted features of entrepreneurship to our unit 
of analysis, the social venture.  To make sense of the complex evidence and multiple constructs 
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in the field of social entrepreneurship we aim to connect the notions of opportunity realization 
and value generation (1) to resource building in the social venture; and (2) as occurring in the 
context of the venture’s ecosystem. We propose that innovative business models enable the 
realization of opportunities by combining internal resources with enabling complementary 
resources from participants in its innovation ecosystem. 
 
Every organization explicitly or implicitly employs a business model to enable it to create value 
for users and customers.  The firm’s business model represents the way the firm is organized to 
create and capture value (Teece, 2010).  Figure 1 illustrates a model of an organization’s value 
generation cycle, showing the firm as an input-output system obtaining resources from its 
ecosystem and transforming them into outputs of value to customers and users. If their mode of 
operation is to be sustained, the entrepreneurial organization must appropriate and retain some of 
the shared value, both economic and social (Davis, 1973, Casson, 1982, Garnsey et al., 2006).  
Retained value may be distributed or reinvested to propel the next phase of the value generation 
cycle.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The value generation model. Source: adapted from (Müller and Garnsey, 2009) 
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An entrepreneurial start-up creates competitive advantage not only from its resource 
endowments, but from a unique assembly of resources that becomes its productive base (Brush et 
al., 2001, Penrose, 1995).  Additional capabilities within the ecosystem can complement the 
firm’s resource base; value-creating participants exert mutual influence to contribute to the 
ecosystem (Garnsey and Leong, 2008). Social entrepreneurs use their networks to seek necessary 
knowledge and resources and so form new combinations of intellectual and social capital 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Singh, 2000).  In this way they enlist input into their value 
generation cycle from partners and in return build shared value through their activities.  
 
In most countries of the world, there exist poor populations whose concerns are with 
affordability, availability, and access to needed products and services (Prahalad, 2006).  
Multinational corporations have recognized these markets as a source of future growth (Prahalad 
and Hammond, 2002) and opportunity (London and Hart, 2004). But there have been few studies 
of grassroots ventures emanating from or directed to those at the base of the pyramid. It is argued 
that the poor should be encouraged to develop local capabilities and contribute to development 
(Karnani, 2007).  
 
 
Building shared value in innovation ecosystems 
In order to examine the role of the social entrepreneur in context, we position their value-creating 
activities within their wider innovation ecosystem (Adner, 2006). Innovation often involves the 
phased transformation of ideas into end products for the customer (Afuah, 2003, Hansen and 
Birkinshaw, 2007).  Ventures in resource-constrained settings exploit opportunities to create and 
secure value by acquiring, leveraging, and building resources in new ways (Sirmon et al., 2007, 
Hugo and Garnsey, 2005).  How conducive an environment is for entrepreneurial innovation 
depends on the nature of the ecosystem, but this can be altered by activities that build networks, 
trust and legitimacy (Ozgen and Baron, 2007, Singh, 2000).   
 
Shared value is promoted by practices that enhance the competitiveness of a organization while 
improving economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates (Porter and 
Kramer, 2011). As Porter points out, the concept of shared value blurs the line between for-profit 
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and non-profit/non-governmental organizations. On the one hand an organization with a social 
focus must also plan strategically for long-term operational viability, on the other, economic 
organisations need to achieve social objectives to gain legitimacy.  It is argued that building 
shared value is not a redistribution of value between the participants of the ecosystem, but an 
expansion of the total pool of economic and social value. Participants in the ecosystem may 
contribute to the mission to which other participants in the value chain are committed.  
 
Value created by each individual organization can be of benefit to other participants, a process 
formalized in partnerships.  There is specialization among producers of knowledge in an 
innovation ecosystem and the entrepreneur often takes on the role of integrating these activities.  
Resource providers may support several participants in the innovation ecosystem who pursue a 
common mission. The organization develops a circle of direct and indirect partners making up its 
ecosystem network (Waddock et al., 2002). 
 
RESEARCH FOCUS AND METHOD  
 
Our research design involved iteration between theory and evidence. Key concepts pointed to 
relevant evidence while observations informed and enhanced the explanatory model used. Prior 
theory provided grounding for the evidence, but the evidence made it possible to adapt and 
extend this theory as a basis for analysis and comparison. To inform and advance our model, two 
in-depth case studies were conducted of sustainable social ventures. The case studies of 
FrontlineSMS and Operation ASHA draw on a inductive and interpretative tradition (Van 
Maanen, 1983) to fill gaps in existing theory (Siggelkow, 2007).  A case study method is 
recommended to present and interpret rich evidence, and provide exemplars to inform 
understanding of a phenomenon that is still obscure (Eisenhardt, 1989). The aim of the 
conceptual model was to compare the organizations selected for observation on a systematic 
basis. “Multiple cases are a powerful means to create theory because they permit replication and 
extension among individual cases…this corroboration helps researchers to perceive patterns 
more easily and eliminate chance associations” (Eisenhardt, 1991 p.620). The conceptual 
framework of the paper operationalizes the concepts of value generation and the innovative 
ecosystem. 
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The objective of this paper is to explore how social ventures build an internal resource base and 
gain complementary resources in order to realize opportunities. The research findings showed 
that both social ventures developed an innovative business model to connect the internal and 
external resources required.  
 
Teleconference interviews and in-person interviews were held with each organization in the time 
period Summer 2011 – Spring 2012.  Additional data collected derives from field interviews, site 
visits and observations of organizational operations.  In selecting interview subjects, founders 
were interviewed first to tap into their experience and ability to offer understanding of the case 
history (Greenhalgh and Taylor, 1997, Patton, 1990).  To guard against retrospective bias and to 
facilitate triangulation, testimonies were checked against personal interviews with junior staff 
and compared with extensive archival sources and review of secondary data including company 
documents, grant proposals and press reports and third-party databases as recommended by (Jick, 
1979).  Interviews varied from thirty minutes to two hours.  Key interviewees checked the 
written cases.  
 
Collected testimonies were analyzed and coded in order to identify how the two entrepreneurial 
organizations combined resources and developed their business models. This allowed for an 
identification of primary themes around co-value creation at the base of the pyramid.  An 
inductive approach was used to take into account the organization’s value creation, using an 
interpretive approach to identify the nature of relations with other ecosystem participants (Garud 
et al., 2002).  
 
 
ORGANIZATION-LEVEL EVIDENCE  
Case study history of FrontlineSMS 
 
Ken Banks founded kiwanja.net in 2003 with a mission to use mobile technology to tackle key 
global challenges in international development such as health, social and environmental 
concerns.  He noticed early the potential of mobile phone technology to enable mass 
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communication and diffusion of knowledge. kiwanja.net operates several projects with 
FrontlineSMS being the largest. FrontlineSMS’s product offering is free open source software 
that can turn a laptop and mobile phone into a central communications hub without reliance on 
an Internet connection.  The program enables users to send and receive text messages with 
groups of people through mobile phones and SMS messaging.  Since its inception, users in 80+ 
countries have benefited from this open source software program. FrontlineSMS has a growing 
team of 15 staff members. Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of FrontlineSMS, the 
most prominent project under kiwanja.net.  
 
 
Figure 2: Kiwanja.net organizational structure including FrontlineSMS 
 
Recognizing an opportunity and mobilizing resources  
Banks was first inspired to think about the radical benefits of mobile technology when he was 
working on wildlife conservation efforts in rural South Africa. He noted that there was no 
Internet access in Kruger National Park and “to communicate, Park Rangers often had to jump 
into Land Rovers and go notify people village-to-village,” says Banks.  
 
Having initially formed the idea of group SMS without the Internet, Banks quickly wrote a 
concept note and shared it with trusted colleagues who shared his concept note with two ex-
Vodafone directors to verify interest and validity.  The idea won recognition and two friends 
offered Banks with £5,000 each to make the prototype.  Although not a trained computer 
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scientist, Banks had taught himself to program at a young age. In the summer of 2005, he spent 5 
weeks coding in Visual Basic to make the first version of code, which he also tested himself.  
The code was released on a new FrontlineSMS website and a couple of weeks after release, the 
first user logged on from Zimbabwe. 
 
During this time Banks was engaged in consulting during the day and would work on 
FrontlineSMS only at night and weekends, checking emails, fixing bugs and uploading new 
code.  In 2006, Banks was awarded a Stanford University Reuters Digital Vision Fellowship as a 
collaboration fellow and moved to the United States for the first time.  A breatkthrough came in 
2007 when a loose coalition of Nigerian NGOs used FrontlineSMS software to monitor their 
national elections.  Through FrontineSMS, voters could text complaints to a computer where the 
data was shared with international election monitoring bodies.  This received popular press 
media coverage and helped diffuse the knowledge of FrontlineSMS software.  Furthermore, in 
2007, FrontlineSMS was used by Pakistan and Myanmar activists to trade information and stay 
connected with each other and the international community (Economist, 2007).  
 
FrontlineSMS received a boost from the MacArthur Foundation and $200,000 to further the 
work in 2007.  This grant allowed Banks to rebuild the FrontlineSMS website and make 
significant upgrades to the software and most importantly, allow Banks to stay at Stanford for an 
additional year and work on his social venture full-time.  
 
Banks returned to the UK in June 2008 by which time there were many more hundreds of users 
of FrontlineSMS. The competitive advantage of FrontlineSMS is its history in helping innovators 
use mobile technology to further their reach and impact while the users contribute valuable 
feedback and expertise back to the online community.  In 2008, FrontlineSMS entered into its 
first official external partnership with another NGO called Ushahidi.  Ushahidi is an emergency 
response newsgathering platform that shares information in remote areas via email and mobile 
phones. The opportunity to pair SMS software together with open-source mapping tools is 
realized through this partnership and adds great value to communication in remote geographies.   
 
In January 2009, the Hewlett Foundation granted FrontlineSMS $400,000 and allowed Banks to 
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hire FrontlineSMS’s first employee, a lead software developer.  Additional resources were 
mobilized in 2010 and 2011 from the Rockefeller Foundation, Open Society Institute and 
Omidyar Network respectively to scale up FrontlineSMS applications.  
 
 
FrontlineSMS: An entrepreneurial innovator  
FrontlineSMS is a social venture that operates on an open, information-sharing, community 
based culture.  FrontlineSMS itself does not confine itself to any one particular sector, but 
focuses on lowering communication barriers for users wherever they may be.  The business 
model depends on initiatives by users.  The users facilitate direct social impact and share best 
practices and failures with the FrontlineSMS community in a dedicated community portal.  An 
illustration of value generation by FrontlineSMS is show in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 3: Value generation model applied to FrontlineSMS 
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The resource base of FrontlineSMS is indispensible to the social venture even though the capital 
value of these resources is not great.  Monetary infrastructure and investment costs for software 
development are relatively low, but human resources are essential and are rare, inimitable 
resources for the social venture.  In particular, the focus, commitment and passion of the staff 
contribute to value creation.  The value created is not easily measured as it takes the form of a 
free public good. The product offerings of FrontlineSMS are downloadable gratis from its 
Internet website including user guides and support services.  The diversity of NGO organizations 
and individuals who use FrontlineSMS software has precluded direct monitoring and evaluation 
of social impact; activities and objectives of users differ greatly.  FrontlineSMS creates value by 
lowering barriers to mass communication and allowing customers to connect with their own end-
users and innovate in their own local contexts.  FrontlineSMS captures value for its social 
venture from the online community hosted by its website.  The online forum allows the 
organization to harness valuable customer feedback, fix bugs and gives FrontlineSMS new ideas 
about areas of expansion.  The value captured by FrontlineSMS is a proxy measure for the value 
created from its free software because it is an indication of usage.  Customers provide 
FrontlineSMS with stories and contribute guest posts.  “These stories really mean a lot to the 
funders”, Banks says, “The posts and comments are direct evidence of social impact, evidence 
that would otherwise be impossible for FrontlineSMS to collect.”  
 
From the popularity of the topics on the online discussion forum, FrontlineSMS software 
developers can monitor which functions are most useful and what further functionality is needed. 
As a result of this value recovery and re-investment into FrontlineSMS, many funders have 
decided to support popular applications of the open software.  FrontlineSMS launched 
FrontlineSMS:forms in 2009 that allows for low-cost real time data collection and aggregation 
for NGOs and fieldworkers (PRNewswire, 2009).   
 
Accessing resources in the innovation ecosystem 
FrontlineSMS currently runs on a donor-resourcing model where the business model is designed 
to attract resource input from grant funding. The resource providers also act as unofficial 
partners as they provide networks and expertise help.  The social mission of FrontlineSMS and 
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its free offering aligns with the mission of their donors to fund great ideas that change the world.  
 
Through the Stanford Reuters Digital Fellowship program, Banks was able to access additional 
resources in the US beyond those available in the UK.  Figure 3 shows that for FrontlineSMS, 
primary funders sources are headquartered in the United States while their program is delivered 
primarily to developing countries.  As a small, agile social venture, FrontlineSMS has the 
advantage of quickly responding to user needs and improving its product offering by writing and 
fixing software. Its product offering is delivered online and FrontlineSMS does not have to be 
located close to its customers.  
 
FrontlineSMS can oversee and integrate all phases of the innovation process from idea/problem 
discovery, development of software solution through to delivery of improved product (posting 
new code for download on website). Banks rapidly built the initial prototype based on his novel 
idea. Subsequent development and diffusion in the FrontlineSMS ecosystem is a longer term, 
iterative process.  FrontlineSMS delivers is product to users via its Internet download option.  In 
turn, the multiple users within its network implement the software and report on potential bugs, 
benefits and challenges.  Feedback is then harnessed to improve future versions of the product.  
 
Banks is aware of the vulnerability of NGOs in that the donors must continually be persuaded to 
provide funds for offerings that do not benefit them directly. Only so long as the donors feel 
some obligation to benefit users and have confidence that FrontlineSMS is helping users, can the 
value generation cycle at FrontlineSMS be sustained. It is for this reason that Banks believes that 
FrontlineSMS “needs to create a for-profit arm at some point in order to be sustainable; it is 
being considered in our consolidation strategy.” 
 
Case Study History of Operation ASHA  
The second social venture studied is Operation ASHA (“asha” meaning “hope” in Hindi).  The 
social venture was founded by Dr Shelly Batra and Mr. Sandeep Ahuja in 2006 with the mission 
to eliminate tuberculosis worldwide.  Tuberculosis, an infectious disease caused by bacterium 
M.tuberculosis is estimated to cause 100 million lost workdays and $300 million USD direct 
costs and $3 billion USD indirect costs to the overall Indian economy (Rajeswari et al., 1999).  It 
	   16 
is clear that failure to detect, treat and prevent TB greatly impedes national development.  
 
Operation ASHA (“OpASHA”) is built on a foundation of partnering with the government to 
overcome the “last mile” delivery problem for patients.  The founders say: 
 
In India, the government provides TB medications for free to all diagnosed patients, TB 
specialist consultations are free, diagnostics are free, but delivery and compliance is hard. 
 
Operation ASHA currently serves 4 million disadvantaged slum-dwellers in 1353 slums spread 
across 14 cities in India.  Operation ASHA distributes TB drug treatment through the WHO-
endorsed TB treatment guidelines of Directly Observed Treatment, Short-Course (DOTS)1 
strategy.  Operation ASHA helps identify TB cases in hard to reach slum 
areas and in turn, treats TB patients directly.  
 
Recognizing an opportunity and mobilizing resources 
Treating tuberculosis is a difficult task, as patients are required to be on daily antibiotic therapy 
for six months.  Even though treatment of tuberculosis is free in the Indian public health system, 
for migratory populations and hourly labourers, visiting a public health clinic daily is difficult.   
Due to the ties between health and poverty, the poor are especially vulnerable to further decline 
if faced with the high economic and social costs of illness or death of a family member (Bank, 
2004).  
 
OpASHA’s model increases access to tuberculosis treatment and lowers stigma of attending 
government clinics for the patients. OpASHA clinics are located in popular urban community 
intersections and provide access to counselling.  A TB medicine rack is placed alongside shops, 
huts and temples of authorized Operation ASHA medicines Providers.  These sites provide TB 
education and awareness as well as a convenient place for patients to take their medicine.  These 
clinic Providers offer flexible operating hours so that patients do not have to miss work to obtain 
their medication.    
 
                                                   
1 WHO Definition of DOTS TB Strategy http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/stb/dots_definition.htm - accessed January 
12, 2011 
	   17 
OpASHA has created a social innovation model based on social franchising of individual clinics 
that maximizes the number of people helped with available resources.  The franchising business 
model consists of a contractual relationship between a franchisee and a franchisor in which the 
franchisee agrees to produce a product or service in accordance with a strict protocol set out by 
the franchisor (Curran and Stanworth, 1983).  Social franchising is an attempt to use franchising 
methods to achieve social, rather than financial objectives alone (Montagu, 2002). The success of 
the franchisee operational model is dependent on capturing economies of scale associated with 
large organizations while being flexible enough to adapt products and services locally (Kauffman 
and Eroglu, 1998).  
 
In the case of Operation ASHA, growth is not measured in profits alone.  There is no payment of 
franchising fees upstream to OpASHA as the franchisor. The establishment of individual clinics 
and remuneration paid to the staff are classified as community job creation and a positive 
externality alongside its core mission of TB elimination.    
 
Operation ASHA opened its first clinic in New Delhi in 2006 with the Provider of the clinic 
being a former cured TB patient.  Each Provider (eg. shop owner) is asked to devote one shelf in 
their high-traffic location to store OpASHA TB medicines and to tick off the patient’s name 
every time medication is taken each day.  Each urban slum clinic serves on average 60 patients 
with an approximate 10 minute walking time for each patient to the clinic. The Provider is paid 
on average 500 rupees a month ($10-12 USD) and has low incentive to take on additional 
patients, which may decrease quality and attention of care.  2000 rupees per month is the average 
income for these chosen Providers and therefore the extra 500 rupees from Operation ASHA is a 
welcome contribution.  
 
There are additional benefits for the OpASHA TB clinic Provider other than direct remuneration.  
For example, news spreads by word of mouth leading to increased foot traffic to the small 
business location, beneficial for small-shop owners or local private clinicians. In addition, as part 
of the TB medicines provision by the government of India, OpASHA clinics are stocked with 
over-the-counter medicines to treat TB drug side effects such as headache or nausea. These 
common medications are also provided free of charge to all persons within the urban slum who 
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request it from the Provider. The Providers gain respect in the communities they serve.  
Operation ASHA clinics provide specific care for TB patients but also provides an in-road for 
quality medicines in areas where access is usually scarce.  
 
For every two Operation ASHA clinics and Providers, there is an assigned Operation ASHA 
Counsellor.  The Counsellor’s role is to identify, educate and treat each TB patient.  Prior to 
commencing the medicines regimen, the Counsellor first visits the patient’s home and explains to 
the patient the importance of TB treatment, and dangers of non-compliance. Medical advice and 
education are dispensed not only to the patient, but also to immediate family members to create a 
support network. The Counsellor is in full-time employment with Operation ASHA earning a 
base salary and incentive bonus for low defaults in their coverage area.  
 
For every 8 Operation ASHA clinic centers combined with 4 Counsellors, there is 1 Program 
Manager who leads this replicable unit2.  Operation ASHA has enabled a scale-able model of TB 
delivery through the use of standardized training, facilitation and processes configured as a social 
franchise model (Prata et al., 2005).  Operation ASHA’s model provides high standard quality 
TB care per DOTS strategy, and also supports micro-entrepreneurs in its Providers and creates 
full-time gainful employment for its Counsellors and Program Managers.  
 
Counsellors receive a monthly base salary from OpASHA headquarters and also receive a bonus 
for maintaining patient compliance with the TB medicines regimen.  For example, when a patient 
misses a scheduled dosage appointment with the Provider clinic, the Provider informs the 
Counsellor and it is the Counsellors responsibility to locate the patient, re-educate the importance 
of compliance and ensure the patient gets back on track.  Secondly, Counsellors are also 
compensated through a government of India scheme for active TB case-finding.  Counsellors 
will observe, inquire and check upon suspected TB patients in the local community and if upon 
correct diagnoses after laboratory tests, Counsellors receive $4 USD per active-case TB 
identification.  Counsellors will thus monitor closely the work of the Providers and work 
diligently on patient tracking.   
 
                                                   
2 Per discussion with Dr. Shelly Batra January, 2011 
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An Entrepreneurial Innovator: Operation ASHA  
The micro-entrepreneur business model that Operation ASHA has built to create jobs and deliver 
effective healthcare for TB patients in urban slums generates value for both the end-patient and 
their community.  The value generation and economic and social benefits shared by Operation 
ASHA is illustrated below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Value generation model applied to Operation ASHA 
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Value creation can be measured as collective value delivered to the customer, or patient.  
OpASHA has treated over 10,000 patients and a potential 120,000 infectious have been 
prevented, indirectly saving the Indian economy $2.4 USD million on healthcare expenditures 
and benefiting millions of urban slum-dwellers.  It is estimated that each cured individual will 
earn an additional Rs. 6,000 ($120) per year after treatment.  The urban slum community and 
operational partners share the economic and social value captured by successful treatment.  
Reinvestment into OpASHA means an ability to expand and maintain the franchisee network.  
 
Accessing resources in the innovation ecosystem 
OpASHA builds value through a network of partnerships within its innovation ecosystem.  The 
partnerships support the social franchising business model and new technological innovation to 
allow its operations to deliver more value for less cost.  The central partnership with the Indian 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare provides free TB diagnosis and medicines for each 
OpASHA patient served (valued approximately $375 USD per patient).  In addition, the 
government awards $25 per patient to any NGO working to provide DOTS treatment to TB 
patients.  OpASHA clinics can each be financially sustainable through partnership with the 
public sector after two years. The government of India covers 80% of OpASHA’s operating 
costs3.  The remaining 20% of costs are cultivated through external resource providers including 
individual donors, corporations and large foundations.  OpASHA receives non-financial 
technical support form its Board of Advisors including strategy, governance and financial advice.  
 
OpASHA has partnered with Microsoft Research to use technology to monitor incentive pay. An 
eDOTS biometric system linked to an electronic medical records (EMR) database has been 
developed using open-source software tailored to OpASHA’s requirements. Operation ASHA 
development manager and co-founder explained to us:  
 
Monitoring the work of our Counsellors is very important as part of their pay is incentive-based.  We need to 
effectively use technology to reduce monitoring costs of our individual clinics. Using an electronic database allows 
our field staff to cover more clinics and enable expansion. 
 
The standard regimen requires patients to take their medicines under the direct supervision of a 
                                                   
3 Per discussion with Dr. Shelly Batra January, 2011 
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health worker.  However, there is no reliable way to ensure that the observation took place at the 
Provider clinic.  The eDOTS technology provides a solution to this problem by confirming a TB 
patient’s presence by requiring patients to scan their fingerprint at a clinic’s terminal machine.  
This creates instant evidence of a patient’s attendance to a clinic and real-time database 
information for Operation ASHA at headquarters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Operation ASHA Counsellor using the eDOTS electronic medical records system  
 
The integration of innovative eDOTS technology helps OpASHA in multiple ways at different 
organizational levels.  For the Counsellor, eDOTS allows for ease of follow-up with patients on 
the missed regimen schedule.  For the Program Manager, an automatic, reliable and timely report 
is generated at request and helps with coordination of multiple sites.  For OpASHA headquarters, 
synchronized operational data is received for accurate planning.  The integration of baseline 
tracking and monitoring technology allows for better reliability, decreased monitoring costs and 
increased transparency.  
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Figure 6: Operation ASHA occupies a delivery role in the innovation ecosystem for tuberculosis treatment and 
control 
 
The value created in the delivery of healthcare diffuses to all other parts of the innovative 
ecosystem. OpASHA relies on innovations produced by other participants such as drug suppliers 
and diagnostic firms to help innovate for medical tools to fight TB.  Armed with better tools, 
OpASHA can deliver future innovations easily through its established franchisee network.  
 
Diffusion effects are also in evidence outside of India. At the international level, Operation 
ASHA founders have been elected onto the Board of the Stop TB Partnership, a global alliance 
of organizations working to combat TB.  The Board position allows OpASHA to share its 
operational business model and disseminate best practices to other national TB programs.   
 
 
ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 
The cases of FrontlineSMS and Operation ASHA demonstrate the factors that enable social 
ventures to innovate on a sustained basis in two contrasting sectors and locations.  Both 
exemplars have successfully created value and achieved social impact by building business 
models that suit their operating contexts and cater for base of pyramid and grassroots needs 
(Table 1).   
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Table 1: Key factors compared for innovation by FrontlineSMS and Operation ASHA 
 
 FrontlineSMS Operation ASHA 
Year Launched 2005 2006 
Sector Information, Communications, 
Technology for Development 
Global Health 
Intervention Discovery, Development, Delivery Healthcare Delivery 
Size (as of employees) 1 15 180 
Business models Open-source, user collaboration 
online 
Social-franchising, public-private 
partnership 
Resource base Founders passion, IT knowledge, 
ICT products travel easily over 
geographic boundaries 
Founders passion, medical 
knowledge, local context and trust in 
community 
Resource providers Foundations / Funders Government of India / Funders 
Value created Enables mass communication at 
grassroots level, platform for users 
to innovate themselves 
Treatment of TB for marginalized 
populations, jobs created in local 
community 
Value captured Iterative contributions to blog by 
users and online forum to share 
stories of impact and new ways to 
deploy software 
Social return on investment for the 
economy, trust gained within 
community, best practices and 
technical knowledge gained 
Current and future markets Sector-specific programs: education, 
microfinance, legal, radio 
India expansion and expansion 
abroad using same model 
Time to market 5 weeks 8 months 
Founder(s) characteristics 12 years field experience working on 
conservation and development 
projects in Africa, self-taught in IT, 
degree in social anthropology 
10 year collaboration between 
experienced medical doctor who did 
annual pro-bono work in the slums 
and Former government of India 
official who helped fundraise of pro-
bono supplies and medicines 
 
1As at 2012 
Table 1 compares the innovation process in the two cases, showing how key concepts were 
informed by evidence.  A business model is a design for an organization, both conceptual and 
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operational. It represents the way an organization creates value and retains enough of the value it 
generates to sustain its activities.  Thus the value generation cycle shown for each case 
operationalized business models.  The evidence shows that a key challenge to social ventures is 
to devise an innovative business model that can develop internal resources and mobilize 
complementary resources of other participants in their ecosystem.   
 
FrontineSMS chose an open-source model to help its users lower the costs of communication in 
the field. Users deploy FrontlineSMS software and conducts downstream field-testing.  Product 
benefits and resilience reports are then fed back to the FrontlineSMS team through an online 
community that is transparent to all customers, further advancing user-led innovation.  Operation 
ASHA chose a social-franchising business model to standardize delivery of medicines over 
extended treatment periods.  Its product offering is also free and provided as an extension of 
India’s public health policy. Building shared value that attracts sustained funding allows social 
ventures to sustain their operations and continue to create and capture value in the long-term 
(Figure 1). Social ventures interacted systematically with ecosystem participants in order to 
further their innovations in an open innovation model.  The case comparison reveals a marked 
difference between innovators in that one was extending an already operational innovation 
ecosystem (OpASHA) to the other that created a new innovation ecosystem to diffuse a 
disruptive new technology (FrontlineSMS).  This advances the conceptual framework, showing 
the need to differentiate between mobilization of participants in an existing innovation ecosystem 
(Adner, 2006) and construction of a new ecosystem for innovation.  
 
Both FrontlineSMS and OpASHA demonstrate effective entrepreneurial solutions to accessing 
hard-to-reach customers at the base of the income pyramid.  In facilitating communication and 
delivery of healthcare services, both operate in areas where there were no such services before.  
The benefits for the end user are much greater than the current alternatives (inadequate or 
expensive communications and healthcare), so meeting a key criterion for value creation, 
superiority to substitutes (Lepak et al 2007).  To date, both social ventures are relatively small in 
terms of age and number of employees, but as they scale up, building additional evidence and 
credibility; their social impact will increase.  
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The resource providers (donors) of both social ventures recognize that the activities they are 
funding have positive social impact, both direct and indirect.  There is a high level of trust by the 
donors in the integrity and dependability of the founders. As shown in Table 1, the founders 
possessed in-depth field knowledge prior to starting their social ventures.  Idea formation and 
opportunity recognition initially derived from their urge to solve problems they faced in their 
daily operations. This enabled them to recognize real needs and develop solutions of value to 
other users.  Banks was working on conservation projects in South Africa when he first thought 
of improving communication efficiency among park rangers and local communities.  Dr Batra 
and Ahuja had been collaborating for over ten years on pro-bono medical services for Indian 
slum populations before starting Operation ASHA.  The founders wanted to innovate in order to 
improve the way they could serve their communities.  Each social venture piloted their idea 
independently of large resource providers, using the founders’ own time and resources.  
However, neither social venture could have grown and scaled up their operations without the 
support of complementary strategic resource providers.   
 
The value generation cycle of the two BOP social ventures lack the customer payment link that 
translates user benefits into direct economic returns as compared to commercial ventures. The 
social entrepreneurs must convince funders that their grants will be devoted towards shared goals 
and to support further social impact. OpASHA has the more secure source of funding of the two, 
backed by supportive government policy on achieving TB elimination. FrontlineSMS depends on 
international donors who have other commitments, but so long as the applications of its 
technology continually attract new donors, a commercial arm of the kind under consideration 
may not be needed.  Direct beneficiaries can be measured by the number of users of 
FrontlineSMS software and the number of patients treated by OpASHA.  However, the indirect 
benefits of improved communications for grassroots NGOs and of the reduction in cases of 
infectious disease cannot be easily measured, they are invaluable.  
 
Building shared value in innovation ecosystems 
The scarcity of economic resources at the base of the pyramid makes it difficult for supply and 
demand mechanisms to operate as they do in developed market structures.  Each of these social 
ventures detected and responded to unexpressed but latent demand and developed business 
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models to provide needed services.  In this section, we compare how their business models help 
build shared value within the innovative ecosystem.  
 
FrontlineSMS uses mobile telephony to lower communication barriers for users at the base of the 
pyramid worldwide. It creates shared value together with the multiple users who use, test, report 
and feedback into software development.  This is an ecosystem in which network effects operate 
as more users download FrontlineSMS software and implement it in their own projects, 
subsequently sharing their results, leading to more users taking up this offering.  Users are 
further empowered to build their own systems of plug-ins around the core software (Banks, 
2011). Uses include epidemiology tracking (Freifeld et al., 2010) and election monitoring 
(Economist, 2007). Current users ensure that the donor resource providers are able to see 
evidence of the social impact created by the software; this reassures them that their funds are 
being well spent to benefit users in need.  FrontlineSMS enables additional social 
entrepreneurship; it offers technology innovation that give local people ownership of tools they 
need to accomplish their goals. By sharing the results of implementation, new knowledge created 
can be shared with other users and resource providers alike.  This diffusion of knowledge can 
result in new users, new software functionality and further progress for FrontlineSMS’s mission.  
 
Operation ASHA builds shared value through its social-franchising business model with its 
primary resource provider, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.  The government 
enables OpASHA’s business model by providing free medicines, diagnosis and bonuses for 
Counsellors when they maintain high compliance rates and actively find cases.  In turn, through 
efforts working with marginalized populations, OpASHA enables better TB healthcare delivery, 
and decrease in overall TB disease burden.  OpASHA’s competitive advantage lies in reaching 
patients beyond the reach of the public health system. The founders’ personal networks linking 
the medical and public policy arenas in India enabled them to tackle an epidemic and to provide 
a solution that could be scaled up. Drawing on their prior knowledge (Shane, 2000) and 
recognizing critical issues faced by the poor, they were able to attract inter-organizational 
partners to help them further their social mission and technology partners to support growth in 
key areas.  
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As shown in Figures 3 and 4 and summarized in Table 1, both case study firms operate in areas 
that attract little commercial interest and suffer from resource-scarcity. They have 
operationalized their business models by recruiting resource providers whose aims are aligned 
with their social missions. There are no realistic alternatives or substitutes available to their users 
who are unable to afford higher-end solutions. The resource providers recognize that the social 
ventures they are funding are filling gaps in the innovation system as lone providers.  “We have 
zero direct competitors,” commented Banks of FrontlineSMS, “Nobody else is working in the 
same way, in the last mile at the base of the pyramid.” 
 
Increasingly, as social ventures begin to grow and scale up their activities, their resource 
providers also evolve.  For example, FrontlineSMS is starting to move away from restricted 
program funding where the resource provider gives a grant for a specific program or software 
application, to receiving general operational funding.  This allows FrontlineSMS to invest in 
scaling up operations and finding ways to maintain financial sustainability.  The same is true for 
Operation ASHA, which started with direct grants and a single clinic.  It took about 8 months for 
OpASHA to assess its pilot project with regard to patient compliance, to test and modify the 
counselling model and ensure smooth communications. OpASHA clinics can be self-sustaining 
after two years in a health system providing government incentives and free medicines.  
Resource providers are now funding expansion rather than maintenance costs of existing clinics.   
 
FrontlineSMS enjoyed the much more rapid development process that is possible in IT.  From 
inception, Banks built his first prototype in five weeks.  The iterations of the software including 
bug fixes can be as fast as hours. In general, healthcare products and services require a longer 
development trajectory than software and IT products and services.  Diffusion of OpASHA’s 
services require a large contingent of staff who deliver counseling and follow-up in person, 
whereas FrontlineSMS’s offering is diffused via the Web.  OpASHA’s resource providers are 
experienced in the health field and understand the longer time demands.  OpASHA’s primary 
resource provider, the government, is also its primary strategic partner.  The values co-created by 
the social ventures are shared in a continuous feedback loop with their resource providers.  
 
While our conceptual model enabled us to compare FrontlineSMS and OpASHA on a systematic 
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basis, the evidence they provide also informed our value generation model. The cases show how 
social ventures with limited resources can innovate effectively to meet needs of impoverished 
populations.  In these cases, innovative business models harnessed network diffusion effects and 
social-franchising techniques, respectively.  The cases confirm that value can be generated and 
operations sustained to meet the needs at the base of the pyramid.  Existing ecosystems can be 
made more effective (e.g. through healthcare delivery to marginalized pockets) or new 
innovation ecosystems can be constructed (e.g. to diffuse low cost technologies to the poor).  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study advanced through iteration between theory and evidence. Theoretical constructs 
helped us identify relevant evidence, and subsequent observations advanced and refined the 
theoretical approach. The cases differed considerably in sector, location and business model but 
the conceptual framework identified common traits and processes that might otherwise have 
been overlooked.  Both met a key challenge for social ventures, to develop unique internal 
resources and use these to attract complementary resources from others. Their business models 
met donor requirements that social impact be realized from their funding, thus aligning users, 
donors and innovators in a value generation cycle. The case studies of social ventures 
demonstrated that an operational business model enables strategic objectives to be achieved even 
when these involve social and not purely economic value. Evidence on the business models of 
social ventures showed how these could be developed to link internal and external resources 
needed to create social value even in environments of scarcity. To make this possible, sector-
specific resource providers are required who understand the opportunities and challenges in their 
field. For example, innovations in ICT can be rolled out rapidly but encounter complex network 
effects, while healthcare innovations require patient funders. In conditions of resource scarcity, 
well-informed resource providers can contribute more than financial resources to the social 
venture by sharing their expertise and experience on strategy and governance. Further research 
could apply the conceptual model to other sectors and innovations and use multiple case studies 
to extend and elaborate theory (Eisenhardt, 1991). Future work can also give more consideration 
to funder goals and needs of BOP social ventures.  
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Recent research on innovation has concentrated on large multi-national corporations who view 
the base of the pyramid as providing new sources of demand (Dess et al., 2003, Immelt et al., 
2009, Prahalad and Hammond, 2002). Entrepreneurial actors in grassroots ventures are still a 
largely unknown force. But even limited evidence reveals their great potential. They can devise 
innovative business models that create and capture value in resource-scarce ecosystems and 
advance innovations from idea to deliverable. The case studies show how this can be achieved: 
through shared value creation by social entrepreneurs together with external resource providers, 
public and private, enlisted on a shared mission. 
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